Crowdsensing Game with Demand Uncertainties: A Deep Reinforcement
  Learning Approach by Zhan, Yufeng et al.
1Crowdsensing Game with Demand Uncertainties: A
Deep Reinforcement Learning Approach
Yufeng Zhan, Yuanqing Xia, Senior Member, IEEE, Jiang Zhang, Ting Li, and Yu Wang, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—Currently, explosive increase of smartphones with
powerful built-in sensors such as GPS, accelerometers, gyroscopes
and cameras has made the design of crowdsensing applications
possible, which create a new interface between human beings
and life environment. Until now, various mobile crowdsensing
applications have been designed, where the crowdsourcers can
employ mobile users (MUs) to complete the required sensing
tasks. In this paper, emerging learning-based techniques are
leveraged to address crowdsensing game with demand uncer-
tainties and private information protection of MUs. Firstly, a
novel economic model for mobile crowdsensing is designed, which
takes MUs’ resources constraints and demand uncertainties
into consideration. Secondly, an incentive mechanism based on
Stackelberg game is provided, where the sensing-platform (SP)
is the leader and the MUs are the followers. Then, the existence
and uniqueness of the Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) is proven
and the procedure for computing the SE is given. Furthermore,
a dynamic incentive mechanism (DIM) based on deep reinforce-
ment learning (DRL) approach is investigated without knowing
the private information of the MUs. It enables the SP to learn the
optimal pricing strategy directly from game experience without
any prior knowledge about MUs’ information. Finally, numerical
simulations are implemented to evaluate the performance and
theoretical properties of the proposed mechanism and approach.
Index Terms—Incentive-aware mechanism, demand uncertain-
ties, Stackelberg game, deep reinforcement learning
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the ubiquity of mobile devices such as smart-phones and tablets that are equipped with multiple
powerful built-in sensors including GPS, accelerometer, gy-
roscope, camera, etc., the mobile crowdsensing (MCS) ap-
plications which provide location based services [1] become
possible. Currently, various of MCS systems [2]–[4] have
been deployed that cover almost every aspect of our lives,
including healthcare, intelligent transportation, environmental
monitoring, etc.
In the MCS system that offers crowdsensing applications,
the sensing-platform (SP) will recruit mobile users (MUs) at
locations of interest to report sensing data. Many of existing
MCS systems [5], [6] are based on the voluntary partici-
pation from MUs. However, to perform the sensing tasks,
Yufeng Zhan, Yuanqing Xia and Jiang Zhang are with the School
of Automation, Key Laboratory of Intelligent Control and Decision of
Complex Systems, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing 100081, P. R.
China. E-mail: zhanyf1989@gmail.com (Zhan), xia yuanqing@bit.edu.cn
(Xia), bitzj2015@outlook.com (Zhang).
Ting Li and Yu Wang are with the Wireless Networking and Sensing
(WiNS) Lab, Department of Computer Science, University of North Car-
olina at Charlotte, Charlotte, NC 28223, USA. E-mail: tli8@uncc.edu (Li),
yu.wang@uncc.edu (Wang).
the participating MUs have to consume their own resources
such as computing and communicating energy. Moreover, the
MUs may face the potential privacy threats when the sensing
data is submitted with own sensitive information (e.g. location
tags and visiting patterns). For these reasons, the MUs would
not be interested in participating in the sensing tasks unless
they receive a satisfying reward to compensate their resources
consumption and potential privacy breach. Therefore, it is
necessary to design an effective incentive mechanism that can
stimulate the MUs to participate in the crowdsensing applica-
tions. In order to achieve the maximum user participation level,
large quantities of incentive-aware mechanisms [7]–[11] have
been proposed by research community for the MCS systems.
Notably, in real practice, the smart devices’ resources such
as energy are limited, and these resources need to satisfy
MUs’ varying demand caused by their uncertain behavior (e.g.,
when MUs are busy at work, their smart devices may be free.
When MUs want to have entertainments, their smart devices
may be occupied with few resources left). However, few of
these aforementioned works take MUs uncertain behavior into
consideration. Therefore, the design of incentive mechanism
for MCS game with demand uncertainties is still an open
problem.
To deal with this problem, in this paper, the interaction be-
tween SP and MUs is formulated into a two-stage Stackelberg
game. As shown in Fig. 1, in Stage I, the SP as the leader
of the Stackelberg game first determines and broadcasts its
pricing policy. In Stage II, each MU as a follower computes
his or her sensing effort based on the price offered by the SP,
his or her resources constraints and demand uncertainties. The
analysis in this two-stage problem is particularly challenging,
as we need to characterize the SP’s profit by first computing
the MUs’ sensing effort with demand uncertainties. Through
mathematical analysis, the existence and uniqueness of the
Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) in this MCS game is proven
and the expressions for computing the SE is derived. That
is, the SP in Stage I has an optimal pricing strategy and the
MUs in Stage II also have optimal decisions under their own
demand uncertainties.
However, in order to compute the SE of the above static
MCS game, the SP needs to know the private information
of the MUs, which is impossible in lots of practical sit-
uations. To protect MUs’ private information, the dynamic
MCS game is modeled and dynamic incentive mechanism
based on deep reinforcement learning (DRL) approaches are
employed, which enable the sensing platform to learn the
optimal pricing strategy directly from game experience (the
past game records). Since the game experience of the SP can
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Fig. 1: Illustration of MCS system.
be regarded as a motivation for its future pricing strategy,
the dynamic MCS game can be formulated into a Markov
Decision Process (MDP) problem. Thus, it can be addressed
by DRL algorithms effectively [12].
Overall, the main contributions of this paper can be sum-
marized as follows:
1) A novel economic model for the MCS game with
MUs’ resources constraints and demand uncertainties is
formulated and an incentive mechanism based on a two-
stage Stackelberg game is designed.
2) The existence and uniqueness of the SE in the proposed
MCS game is proven and its computing procedure is
provided, revealing the feasibility of allowing MCS
game to cope with MUs’ uncertain demand and limited
resources.
3) A dynamic incentive mechanism (DIM) based on DRL
approach for the dynamic MCS game is proposed, which
enables the SP to learn the optimal pricing strategy
directly from game experience without any prior knowl-
edge about MUs’ private information.
4) Numerical simulation results demonstrate the effective-
ness of the proposed incentive mechanisms for both of
the static MCS game and the dynamic MCS game. It
is also derived that the demand uncertainties have a
significant impact on MCS system performance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
provides a literature review. Section III presents the network
economics model of the crowdsensing system. The incentive
mechanism based on a two-stage Stackelberg game for the
static MCS game is designed in Section IV and the DRL-
based dynamic incentive mechanism for the dynamic MCS
game is designed in Section V. In Section VI, the numerical
simulations are conducted to evaluate the performance of the
proposed incentive mechanisms, followed by conclusions of
this paper in Section VII.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
MCS has been widely studied in recent years [1]. For
example, Reddy et al. [13] developed an application to enable
sensing platform employ well-suited participants to complete
sensing tasks. Xiao et al. [5] and Li et al. [14] both studied
the task allocation and participants selection problem in MCS.
However, these works only focus on the user selection, task
assignment or sensing data collection. They do not consider
the design of incentive mechanism, which has been widely
studied in lots of other fields such as spectrum trading [15],
[16], routing [17], [18], cooperative communication [19], [20],
and network security [21], [22].
A user-centric MCS based on auction-based approach is
proposed in [10], motivating MUs to participate in the MCS
tasks. Lee and Hoh [23] proposed a reverse auction incentive
mechanism based on dynamic prices in offline settings, where
MUs can claim their bidding prices for the sensing data.
Wen et al. [24] proposed an incentive mechanism which took
the MUs’ sensing quality into account, where the MUs are
paid based on the quality of the sensing data instead of
sensing time. Luo et al. [25] assumed that the cost distribution
was known, then they designed an all-pay auction based
incentive mechanism which can maximize the expected profit
and meanwhile satisfied the individual rationality. Zhao et
al. [26] proposed the online auction with budget constraints
which applied the greedy task allocation strategy to achieve
high energy efficiency with good fairness among MUs who
arrived sequentially and randomly. Xu et al. [27] proposed
the incentive mechanisms for time window dependent tasks in
mobile crowdsensing based on reverse auction and formulated
the problem as the social optimization user selection problem.
There are also a few of studies on incentive mechanism
design for MCS based on Stackelberg game. Yang et al.
[10] modeled the platform-centric incentive mechanism as a
Stackelberg game. In their model, the SP has one task in a
sensing slot and announces a total reward. The MUs decide
their sensing strategy according to the total reward and other
MUs’ habits. Duan et al. [28] used the Stackelberg game to
design a threshold revenue model for the MUs. They studied
two applications, data acquisition and distributed computing.
For data acquisition, they took a threshold revenue model,
in which a certain number of MUs are required to build the
corresponding data base successfully. And for distributed com-
puting and heterogeneous users, a contract-based mechanism
had been designed to decide different task-reward combina-
tions. Cheung et al. [29] designed the delay-sensitive mobile
crowdsensing based on Stackelberg game. In [30], Maharjan
et al. proposed the multimedia application of crowdsensing
based on Stackelberg game. However, these works did not take
MUs’ demand uncertainties into consideration, which is still
a challenging problem since the MUs’ resources are limited
and their behaviors are uncertain in reality. A work related to
this problem is [7], where Zhan et al. studied the incentive
mechanism design with demand uncertainties. However, [7]
was based on one-to-many bargaining approach where the SP
3needed to cooperate with all the MUs. While in a free market,
the SP does not know the MUs and the MUs also do not know
each other. Therefore, it is impossible to reach a partnership
in a free market MCS.
In addition, most of the existing MCS systems based on
Stackelberg game approach require the private information of
the participants. To deal with this problem, Xiao et al. [31]
designed the secure MCS, they still used the Stackelberg game
to formulate the interaction between the SP and MUs. They
designed the Q-Learning and deep Q-Learning approaches to
learn the optimal strategy of the SP and MUs, in which the
SP did not need know the private information of the MUs. It
is noteworthy that their approaches can only cope with MCS
game with discrete pricing strategy. When the pricing strategy
is continuous, their methods are unable to work.
Therefore, how to design the incentive mechanism for MCS
game with MUs’ demand uncertainties based on Stackelberg
game in a free market and how to address private information
protection problem of MUs under continuous pricing condi-
tions become the focuses of this paper.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a single SP which resides in the cloud and
consists of some servers. A set N = {1, 2, · · · , N} of MUs
that connect to the sensing-platform via the Internet. The
sensing-platform will stimulate the mobile users to participate
in the MCS tasks via rewards. More specifically, the SP’s
economic model is described in Section III-A and the model
of the MUs is presented in Section III-B, followed by the
problem formulation in Section III-C finally.
A. SP’s Payoff
The economic model for SP concentrates on the direct utility
for the SP. That is, the utility increase only from the MUs’
sensing level1. Let φ(·) denote the SP’s utility. We will employ
a generic utility function which is continuous, differentiable,
strictly increasing and strictly concave. φ(·) consists of two
main characteristics of widely used utility functions [8], [9]:
i) φ(·) increases with MUs’ sensing level and ii) the growth
rate of φ(·) decreases with the MUs’ sensing level increasing,
i.e., ∂φ(·)∂xi ≥ 0 and
∂2φ(·)
∂2xi
< 0.
Let xn denote MU n’s sensing resources contribution to
SP, and pn ≥ 0 denote the SP’s price to MU n. The sensing
contribution profile and price profile are, respectively,
x
∆
= [x1, x2, · · · , xN ]T ,p ∆= [p1, p2, · · · , pN ]T .
Given x and p, the total cost of the SP which is the
payments to the MUs is
C(x,p) =
N∑
i=1
pi · xi.
1Some indirect utilities include network effects which monotonically in-
crease with the sensing level [32].
SP’s payoff characterizes the gap between utility and cost,
which is formulated as
U(x,p) = φ(x)−
N∑
i=1
pi · xi (1)
= φ(x)− pTx.
The utility function for the SP is defined as follows
φ(x) = λ · ln(1 +
N∑
i=1
ln(1 + xi)), (2)
where λ is the SP’s parameter specific to the SP’s sensing
task. The ln(1 + xi) term reflects the SP’s diminishing return
on the service of MU i, and the outer ln term reflects the
SP’s diminishing return on the number of the MUs. This kind
of utility function has been widely accepted to represent the
utility of the SP in the previous works [7], [10], [30].
For analyzing conveniently in the following part, we set
b = 1 +
N∑
i=1
ln(1 + xi). (3)
Therefore, (2) can be rewritten as
φ(x) = g(b) = λ · ln(b).
B. MUs’ Payoff
Every MU will carry a smartphone, and the MU’s primary
goal is to meet its own basic needs, which including making
phone calls, sending messages, etc. Due to the development
of microprocessors, nowdays, the smartphones are more and
more powerful. After satisfying the MUs’ basic needs, the
smartphone still left some resources, which can be used to do
some other activities, such as entertainment, noise monitoring,
traffic monitoring, etc. That is, for MU n, the remaining energy
of its smartphone can be used to entertain itself or participate
in the MCS. Therefore, when deciding whether to participate
in the MCS and distribute how many resources to the sensing
task, each MU will consider both the resources demand of
itself and rewards provided by the SP.
Let ξn denote the MU n’s own resources demand. Due
to the uncertainties of n’s behaviors2, ξn is defined as a
random variable, also with a certain interval [ξn, ξn]. Where
ξn follows a probability distribution function fn(ξn) and a
cumulative distribution function Fn(ξn). Suppose that n has
τn units resources remaining, let δn denote the average revenue
achieved from one unit of n’s own demand and cn denote the
cost for one unit of n’s resource consumption. Then, MU n’s
expected profit (from serving its own demand) is
Rn(τn)= (δn − cn) · Eξn [min{ξn, τn}] (4)
=(δn − cn) · (
τn∫
ξn
ξnfn(ξn)dξn +
ξn∫
τn
τnfn(ξn)dξn).
2E.g. sometime n may use the smartphone for long time entertainments,
which leads n to have few resources to participate in the crowdsensing.
4Now, if MU n admits xn units of resources to participate
in the MCS for serving the SP, the resources left for serving
n’s own demand are τn − xn, and a feasible xn must satisfy
xn ≤ τn, obviously. For feasible xn and pn, the MU n’s total
profit including both the profit from serving its own demand
and the profit from sensing for the SP is defined as
RTOTn (xn, pn) = Rn(τn − xn) + pn · xn − cn · xn, (5)
where pn · xn − cn · xn is the profit from serving the SP,
including the sensing income (i.e. SP’s payment pn · xn) and
the sensing cost cn · xn.
Finally, the payoff of MU n is the profit increment when
providing sensing data for the SP, which is denoted by
Un(xn, pn)=R
TOT
n (xn, pn)−RTOTn (0, 0) (6)
=Rn(τn − xn)−Rn(τn)− cn · xn + pn · xn,
where Rn(τn − xn)−Rn(τn)− cn · xn is the MU n’s profit
loss induced by sensing for the SP. Obviously, when the MU
n dose not participate in the MCS, its reservation payoff is 0.
C. Problem Formulation
In order to encourage MUs to participate in the MCS
and hence enhance the sensing quality of the SP, in this
paper, the incentive mechanism of MCS is formulated as a
Stackelberg game [33] based on non-cooperative game theory.
In the Stackelberg game, participants will be classified into
two groups, namely leaders and followers, where the leaders
have the privilege of moving first while the followers will
move according to the leaders’ actions. Specifically, the MCS
game studied in this paper is modeled as a single-leader with
multi-followers Stackelberg game with two stage, where the
SP acts as the leader and all the MUs act as the followers.
Firstly, the SP (i.e. game leader) specifies the pricing strategy
p = [p1, p2, · · · , pN ]T . In the second stage, each MU acts
as the game follower determine its sensing plan x∗n(pn) to
maximize its own payoff.
Given the definition of the Stackelberg game, the SE of the
proposed incentive mechanism is defined as follows.
Definition 1. Let p∗ = [p∗1, p∗2, · · · , p∗N ]T be the optimal solu-
tion to the SP and x∗n(p
∗
n) be the optimal solution to the MU n.
Then, (p∗,x∗) is the SE for the proposed incentive mechanism
if for any possible solution (p,x), following conditions are
satisfied:
Un(x
∗
−n, x
∗
n,p) ≥ Un(x∗−n, xn,p),
U(x(p∗),p∗−n, p
∗
n) ≥ U(x(p∗−n, pn),p∗−n, pn),
where x∗−n and p
∗
−n indicate the MUs’ strategy profile and
SP’s strategy profile excluding nth MU, respectively.
IV. INCENTIVE MECHANISM FOR STATIC MCS GAME
In this section, how to design the incentive mechanism
for the static MCS game by solving the Stackelberg game
defined in Section III-C is demonstrated. In the static MCS
game, the main challenges are (a) how to develop the resource
allocation strategy for the MUs and (b) how to develop a
pricing strategy for the SP. In the following, it is firstly
proven that for any feasible p = [p1, p2, · · · , pN ]T , each
MU has a unique optimal resource allocation strategy in the
second stage (Section IV-A). Afterwards, the pricing strategy
in the first stage is presented and the existence and uniqueness
of the SE for the proposed incentive mechanism is proven
(Section IV-B). Finally, summary of the overall static MCS
game is provided (Section IV-C).
A. Optimal Resource Allocation Strategy at MU
In this subsection, the MU n’s optimal resource allocation
strategy x∗n under SP’s any feasible pricing strategy pn in
the second stage is analyzed. The optimal resource allocation
strategy x∗n for MU n is based on the following optimization
problem
max Un(xn, pn) (7)
s.t. xn ∈ [0, τn].
Lemma 1. Given any feasible pn, MU n’s optimal resource
allocation strategy x∗n satisfies
x∗n(pn) =

0, if pn ∈ [0, p˜n)
τn − F (−1)n ( δn−pnδn−cn ), if pn ∈ [p˜n, δn]
τn, if pn ∈ (δn,+∞),
(8)
where p˜n = cn + (δn − cn)[1− Fn(τn)].
Proof. According to Eq. (4) and (6), Un(τn, xn, pn) (Here-
after, Un will be used instead for convenience) satisfies
Un=(δn − cn)(
τn−xn∫
ξn
ξnfn(ξn)dξn +
ξn∫
τn−xn
(τn − xn)fn(ξn)dξn)− cnxn + pnxn +Rn(τn),
where
τn−xn∫
ξn
ξnfn(ξn)dξn =
τn−xn∫
ξn
ξndFn(ξn)
= (τn − xn)Fn(τn − xn)−
τn−xn∫
ξn
Fn(ξn)dξn,
and
ξn∫
τn−xn
(τn − xn)fn(ξn)dξn=(τn − xn)(1− Fn(τn − xn)).
Therefore,
Un=(δn − cn)(τn − xn −
τn−xn∫
ξn
Fn(ξn)dξn) +
(pn − cn) · xn −Rn(τn).
5Then, the first- and second-order derivatives of Un with respect
to xn can be derived as follows respectively{
∂Un
∂xn
= (δn − cn)(Fn(τn − xn)− 1) + pn − cn,
∂2Un
∂xn2
= −(δn − cn)fn(τn − xn).
Since δn ≥ cn and fn(·) > 0, it can be easily derived that
the second-order derivative of Un to xn is negative. Also, the
xn set of Problem (7) is bounded and compact. Therefore,
Problem (7) is a strictly convex optimization problem. By
setting the first-order of Un to 0, the following equation is
derived
(δn − cn)(Fn(τn − xn)− 1) + pn − cn = 0. (9)
Let
p˜n = cn + (δn − cn)(1− Fn(τn)).
Due that Fn(·) ∈ [0, 1], ∂Un∂xn = 0 is achievable only when
pn ∈ [p˜n, δn]. By solving (9), we obtain
x∗n(pn) = τn − F (−1)n (
δn − pn
δn − cn ).
Moreover, if pn < p˜n, then ∂Un∂xn is less than 0, thus the
optimal allocation strategy for MU n is x∗n = 0. And if pn >
δn, ∂Un∂xn is greater than 0, thus the optimal allocation strategy
for MU n is x∗n = τn. This completes the proof.
Note that when pn ∈ [p˜n, δn], the first-order derivative of
x∗n with respect to pn is
∂x∗n
∂pn
=
1
fn(F
(−1)
n (
δn−pn
δn−cn ))
1
δn − cn .
For any pn ∈ [p˜n, δn], it can be derived that ∂x
∗
n
∂pn
> 0.
This indicates that the higher price offered by the SP is, the
more resources allocated by MUs to the SP are. The second
derivative of x∗n with respect to pn is
∂2x∗n
∂pn2
=
f ′n(F
(−1)
n (
δn−pn
δn−cn ))
(fn(F
(−1)
n (
δn−pn
δn−cn )))
3
1
(δn − cn)3
.
Hence, we can derive that if f ′n(·) ≤ 0 (f ′n(·) ≥ 0), the x∗n
is a concave (convex) function of pn. Notably, in this paper,
it is assumed that f ′n(·) ≤ 03, thus x∗n is a concave function
of pn.
B. Optimal Pricing Strategy at SP
Now, the SP’s optimal pricing strategy p∗ in the first stage
of the Stackelberg game is investigated. For any feasible p, as
has analyzed in Section IV-A, there is a unique x∗(p) indicates
the MUs’ best responses in the second stage of the Stackelberg
game. The optimal pricing strategy at SP is determined by the
following optimization problem
max U(x∗,p) (10)
s.t. pn ≥ 0,∀n ∈ N ,
var. x∗n ∈ [0, τn].
3This is a very common hypothesis. There are lots of distributions satisfying
that their probability distribution function are non-increasing, such as uniform
distribution, exponential distribution, and Gaussian distribution, etc.
For convenience, in the following part, U will be utilized to
replace U(x∗,p).
Since x∗n is the function of pn, according to Eq. (1), the
first-order derivative of U(x∗,p) with respect to pn is
∂U
∂pn
=
∂g(b)
∂b
1
1 + x∗n
∂x∗n
∂pn
− pn ∂x
∗
n
∂pn
− x∗n. (11)
According to Lemma 1, if pn < p˜n or pn > δn, then
∂x∗n
∂pn
≡ 0.
Thus, if pn < p˜n, ∂U∂pn = 0. This indicates that any pn ∈
[0, p˜n) is indifferent to the SP. If pn > δn, ∂U∂pn = −τn. This
indicates that any price pn greater than δn is dominated by
δn. Therefore, the analysis of pn ∈ [0, p˜n] and pn > δn is
meaningless. The following parts only focus on pn ∈ [p˜n, δn],
∀n ∈ N . For convenience, g′(b) and g′′(b) are utilized to
denote ∂g(b)∂b and
∂2g(b)
∂b2 respectively.
Lemma 2. For the optimal pricing strategy profile p∗ =
[p∗1, p
∗
2, · · · , p∗N ]T , p∗n must satisfy
p∗n ≤
g′(b)
1 + x∗n
. (12)
and in addition, p∗n must not blow p˜n, or it is indifferent to
the SP.
Proof. Assume that p∗n >
g′(b)
1+x∗n
, take it into Eq. (11). Since
∂x∗n
∂p∗n
> 0, we can obtain that
∂U
∂p∗n
= (
g′(b)
1 + x∗n
− p∗n)
∂x∗n
∂p∗n
− x∗n < 0.
This implies that there exists a price pn < p∗n− ε (ε is a very
small positive real number), which leads the SP to a higher
payoff. This is in contradiction with that p∗n is the optimal
pricing strategy. Therefore, the assumption does not hold. This
completes the proof.
Moreover, Lemma 2 can be interpreted from a physical
perspective. ∂φ(x
∗)
∂x∗n
is the SP’s utility increasing due to the
unit resource contribution of MU n, which is equal to g
′(b)
1+x∗n
.
While p∗n is the payoff which SP pays to the MU n for its unit
resource contribution. Obviously, SP’s payoff increasing due
to MU n’s contribution must greater than the payoff it pays
to MU n, or it will not recruit MU n.
Lemma 3. Optimization problem (10) has an unique solution.
Proof. The Hassian matrix of U is defined as H , which
satisfies
H =

∂2U
∂p12
∂2U
∂p1∂p2
· · · ∂2U∂p1∂pN
∂2U
∂p2∂p1
∂2U
∂p22
· · · ∂2U∂p2∂pN
...
...
. . .
...
∂2U
∂pN∂p1
∂2U
∂pN∂p2
· · · ∂2U∂pN 2
 .
According to Eq. 1, the second-order derivative of U with
respect to pn is
∂2U
∂pn2
=
g′′(b)− g′(b)
(1 + x∗n)
2 (
∂x∗n
∂pn
)2 − 2∂x
∗
n
∂pn
+ (13)
(
g′(b)
1 + x∗n
− pn)∂
2x∗n
∂pn2
.
6Moreover, the second-order partial derivative of U with respect
to pi and pj is
∂2U
∂pi∂pj
=
∂2U
∂pj∂pi
= g′′(b)
1
(1 + x∗i )(1 + x
∗
j )
∂x∗i
∂pi
∂x∗j
∂pj
.
(14)
Set
H1 =

λ1 0 · · · 0
0 λ2 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · λN
 , (15)
where λn = (
g′(b)
1+x∗n
−pn)∂
2x∗n
∂pn2
−2∂x∗n∂pn −
g′(b)
(1+x∗n)2
(
∂x∗n
∂pn
)2, ∀n ∈
N . According to Lemma 2, g′(b)1+x∗n − pn ≥ 0. Also, we have
declared in Section IV-A, ∂x
∗
n
∂pn
> 0 and ∂
2x∗n
∂pn2
≤ 0. Meanwhile,
we can easily derive that g′(b) > 0. As a result,
λn ≤ 0.
Furthermore, set
H2 = g
′′(b)

H2(1, 1) H2(1, 2) · · · H2(1, N)
H2(2, 1) H2(2, 2) · · · H2(2, N)
...
...
. . .
...
H2(N, 1) H2(N, 2) · · · H2(N,N)
 ,
where H2(i, j) = H2(j, i) = 1(1+x∗i )(1+x∗j )
∂x∗i
∂pi
∂x∗j
∂pj
, ∀i, j ∈ N .
Therefore, we can rewrite H2 as
H2 = g
′′(b)qqT , (16)
where q = [q1, q2, · · · , qN ]T , and qn = 11+x∗n
∂x∗n
∂pn
. According
to the definition of Hassian matrix, we can obtain that
H = H1 +H2.
Randomly select a vector v = [v1, v2, · · · , vN ]T , where vi ∈
R and the elements in v are not all 0. Then we have that
vTHv = vTH1v + v
TH2v.
According to Eq. (15), we can derive that
vTH1v =
N∑
i=1
λkv
2
k ≤ 0.
Based on Eq. (16), we have that
vTH2v = g
′′(b)vTqqTv = g′′(b)(
N∑
i=k
vk
1 + x∗k
∂x∗k
∂pk
)2.
Since g′′(b) = − 1(1+b)2 < 0 and ∂x
∗
k
∂pk
> 0, we can derive that
vTH2v < 0. Therefore, we have that
vTHv < 0.
This indicates that U is a strictly concave function. Further-
more, the constraint set of Problem (10) is nonempty, compact,
and convex. Thus, Problem (10) has a unique solution [34].
This completes the proof.
Through Lemma 1 and Lemma 3, we can obtain that for the
static MCS game in the first stage, SP has a unique pricing
strategy profile p∗, which satisfies
I : p∗n = argmax
pn
U(x∗,p).
In the second stage, each MU has a unique resource allocation
strategy x∗n, which satisfies
II : x∗n = argmax
xn
Un(τn, xn, p
∗
n).
Theorem 1. There exists a unique SE in the static MCS game.
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Fig. 2: Interactions between MUs and SP in static MCS.
C. Overall Static Crowdsensing Game
In this subsection, the overall incentive mechanism based
on static MCS game is presented. In the MCS system, a
centralized SP where the task initiators could reside will lead
the price decision and task allocation procedure. Fig. 2 shows
the detailed interactions between MUs and SP. First, the SP
issues the sensing task, when the MUs are considering to
joint the MCS, they need to register on the SP. Then the
SP decides the pricing strategy according to the optimization
problem defined by (10). Optimization problem (10) can be
solved by Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) method [34]. The MUs
will be informed of the detailed pricing strategy, and then they
could determine the optimal resource allocation strategy based
on Lemma 1. Finally, after the MUs completing the sensing
task and uploading the sensing data, the SP will pay them the
corresponding rewards.
V. DYNAMIC INCENTIVE MECHANISM (DIM) DESIGN FOR
MCS
In this section, a dynamic incentive mechanism (DIM)
based on deep reinforcement learning (DRL) approach is
designed for MCS. Since solving optimization problem OPTI
in Eq. (10) directly requires MUs’ private information such
as τn, δn, cn, having them can be impractical and unsafe for
MUs in reality. Hence, a DRL approach is designed to learn the
optimal strategy directly from game history, during which no
prior knowledge about MUs is required. In the following, we
firstly establish the dynamic MCS game as a Markov Decision
7(t) (t)®s pPolicy:
SP
( )(t) (t) (t +1)®s , p sState Transition:
MUs
Action: (t)p
( )u tPayoff:
State: (t) (t +1)®s s
Fig. 3: Markov decision process.
Process (MDP) for dynamic MCS game. Then, we present the
DRL algorithm designed for SP to find the optimal pricing
strategy in Section IV-B. Finally, we demonstrate the overall
dynamic MCS game based on DRL.
A. MDP for Dynamic MCS Game
The MDP (M) for dynamic MCS game is composed of
state space (S), action space (A), state transition probability
function (P), and reward function (R), namely M =<
S,A,P,R, γ > shown in Fig. 3.
1) State space: We define the state space of M as S =
{s(t)|∀ t ∈ N}, where s(t) = [p(t−L),x(t−L), · · · ,p(t−
1),x(t− 1)] ∈ RN×2L denotes the past L times game history
between SP and MUs. More precisely, p(t) is SP’s pricing
strategy profile at step t and x(t) is MUs’ resource allocation
strategy at step t. When t ≤ L, p(t−L) and x(t−L) can be
initialized randomly.
2) Action space: The action space of M is denoted as
A = {p(t)|∀ t ∈ N}, which consists of SP’s pricing strategy
profiles.
3) State transition probability function: The state transition
probability function is defined as P : S × A × S → [0, 1],
meaning that the state s(t) will transit into s(t+1) satisfying
s(t+ 1) ∼ P (s|s(t),p(t)) after taking action p(t).
4) Reward function: The reward function S × A → R is
proportional to the SP’s payoff as follows
r(t) = ξU(x(t),p(t)), (17)
where ξ is the scaling factor.
5) Problem formulation: Define SP’s policy as pi : S×A →
[0, 1]. Then, the goal of DRL-based DIM design is to find the
optimal policy for SP satisfying
θ∗ = argmax
θ
L1(piθ) = argmax
θ
∫
S
ρ(s)V
(
s
)
ds
= argmax
θ
∫
S
ρ(s)
∫
A
piθ(p|s)Q
(
s,p
)
dpds
(18)
where V
(
s
)
= E
[∑∞
l=1 γ
l−1r(l)|s(1) = s
]
is state value
function, Q(s,p) = E
[∑∞
l=1 γ
l−1r(l)|s(1) = s,p(1) = p]
is the action value function, ρ(s) =
∫
S
∑∞
l=1 γ
l−1P
(
s(l) =
s|s(1), piθ
)
ds(1) is the state probability distribution, and γ ∈
[0, 1] is a discount factor.
B. Policy Optimization for MDP
We adopt policy gradient method based on the proven actor-
critic framework [36] to deal with policy optimization prob-
lem described in Eq. (18). Specifically, we employ an actor
network piθ parameterized by θ to generate stochastic action
a(t) ∼ piθ(·|s(t)) and a critic network Vω parameterized by
ω to approximate the state value function V
(
s(t)
)
.
Referring to the stochastic policy gradient theorems in [37]
and [12], the policy gradient can be calculated as
∇θL1(θ) = Es∼ρ,p∼piθ
[
∇θ log piθ(p|s)Q
(
s,p
)]
= Es∼ρ,p∼piθˆ
[
∇θ log piθ(p|s)f
(
s,p
)
A
(
s,p)
)]
(19)
where f(s,p) = piθ(p|s)piθˆ(p|s) , A
(
s,p
)
= Q
(
s,p
) − V (s) is the
advantage function, and the parameter of policy for sampling
p is θˆ.
Furthermore, in order to increase stability of training process
based on policy gradient, [35] proposed proximal policy
optimization (PPO) method, which clips the policy gradient
as
∇θL′1(θ) = ∇θEs∼ρ,p∼piθˆ
[
min
(
f(·)A(·), η(f(·))A(·))]
≈
D∑
k=1
∇θ log piθ(k)min
[
f(k)Aˆ(k), η(f(k))Aˆ(k)
]
,
(20)
where ∇θ log piθ(k) = ∇θ log piθ(p(k)|s(k)), f(k) =
piθ(p(k)|s(k))
piθˆ(p(k)|s(k)) , Aˆ(k) =
∑D
l=k r(l)+Vω(s(D+1))−Vω(s(k)),
D is number of samples for policy gradient estimation at each
training step, and η(x) is the piecewise function with intervals
[x < 1− ε, 1− ε ≤ x ≤ 1 + ε, x > 1 + ε], ε is an adjustable
parameter.
Finally, the loss function for optimizing the critic network
Vω is defined as
L2(ω) = Es∼ρ(s)
[
− Vω(s) + Es′∼P,p∼piθˆ
[
r + Vω(s
′)
]]2
≈
D∑
k=1
[
− Vω
(
s(k)
)
+
D∑
l=k
r(l) + Vω
(
s(D + 1)
)]2
.
(21)
C. Proposed DRL-based DIM for SP
1) Procedure of dynamic game: As illustrated in Fig. 4,
the SP issues the sensing task firstly. Then, MUs register on
the SP if they determine to join the MCS. At game step t,
the SP will decide the pricing strategy p(t) according to its
game memory matrix s(t). After that, MUs will obtain the
detailed pricing strategy p(t) and then determine the optimal
resource allocation strategy x(t) based on Lemma 1. After
MUs completing the sensing task and uploading the sensing
data, the SP will pay them the corresponding rewards and
attain its own payoff r(t). Finally, the SP will update its
negotation history into s(t+ 1) and start the new game.
2) Update actor and critic networks: Each time after D
times dynamic mobile crowdsensing game, the actor and critic
networks will be updated. More specifically, the SP will
firstly calculate Vω
(
s(k)
)
(k = 1, · · · , D) by critic network.
Afterwards, it will count
∑D
l=k r(l), f(k), and Aˆ(k) (k =
1, · · · , D). Then, the actor network piθ can be updated through
gradient ascend method as
θ ← θ − l1∇θL′1(θ), (22)
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where l1 is the learning rate for actor network updation. The
critic network Vω can be updated through gradient descend
method as
ω ← ω + l2∇ωL2(ω), (23)
where l2 is the learning rate for critic network updation.
3) Detailed explanation of DRL-based DIM: Algorithm 1
illustrates the pseudocode for the proposed DRL-based DIM.
When a game begins, the SP initializes its state (Line 1).
At each step t in dynamic mobile crowdsensing game, by
taking its state as the input of its policy network piθ, the
SP’s pricing strategy profile p(t) can be determined and sent
to MUs (Line 8). After obtaining MUs’ resouce allocation
(Line 9), the SP can calculate its payoffs and reward (Line
10). Then, the SP will update its state and record its game
information (Line 11-12). Parameters of both actor network
and critic network are optimized every D step by utilizing the
past D game record (Line 10-11). After updating these two
neural networks based on gradient ascent method and gradient
descent method respectively for M times (Line 15-16), a new
episode of dynamic game will start (Line 2) and the SP will
clear its replay buffer (Line 3).
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, numerical simulations are conducted. Specif-
ically, 5 MUs are randomly generated. For each MU, cn and
δn are randomly from [0, 1] while guaranteeing δn > cn. We
set the total available resources τn of each MU to 20 units,
and randomly drawn the own resources demand ξn from a
uniform distribution in [0, 25].
A. SE under Dynamic Crowdsensing Game
In this part, simulations have been performed to evaluate the
system performance of the dynamic crowdsensing game, with
λ = 50, cn, δn randomly select from [0, 1] and δn > cn.
Algorithm 1 DRL-based DIM for SP
Input: Game history of the SP s(t).
Output: Pricing strategy profile of the SP p(t).
1: Initialize s(t), piθ and Vω .
2: for Episode in 1, 2, · · · do
3: Clear the replay buffer D.
4: for Step t in 1, 2, · · · , D do
5: if Episode ≥ 2 then
6: s(1) = s(D + 1)
7: end if
8: Input s(t) into the policy network piθ and derive the
pricing strategy p(t).
9: Receive the MUs’ resource allocation strategy x(t).
10: Calculate the SP’s payoff U(x(t),p(t)) by (1) and
its reward rt by (17).
11: Update state s(t) into state s(t+ 1).
12: Store {s(t),p(t), s(t+ 1), r(t)} into D.
13: end for
14: for i in 1, 2, · · · ,M do
15: Calculate ∇θL′1(θ) and ∇ωL2(ω) via (20) and (21).
16: Update θ and ω through (22) and (23).
17: end for
18: end for
Fig. 5a and 5b show the DRL based pricing strategy and
resource allocation strategy converge to the optimal policy
quickly in the dynamic crowdsensing game, which matches
the theoretical results of the SE given in the static crowd-
sensing game in Section IV. This indicates that the incentive
mechanism based on our designed DRL method will efficiently
work. Meanwhile, as shown in Fig. 5c and 5d, the SP’s payoff
and MUs’ payoff will also converge to the stable state quickly.
More specifically, we can see that DIM outperforms the greedy
9and random pricing strategies. This is because in greedy and
random policies, the SP always issues the higher prices to the
MUs which leads the MUs obtain higher payoffs as shown in
Fig. 5d and SP obtains lower payoff.
B. System Performance
Fig. 6 shows the system performance under the dynamic
crowdsensing game when MUs have different δn. In this group
of simulation, cn = 0, while δn is randomly chosen from
(0, 1]. From Fig. 6, it can be observed that there is a unique
SE between SP and MUs. In Fig. 6, the bar charts denote δn.
As shown in Fig. 6b, the x∗n decreases with δn, which implies
that the MUs with lower δn will spend more resources to
serve the SP. As the MU with lower δn, spending resources
for serving itself will create little benefit. Therefore, the SP
only needs a lower price (as shown in Fig 6a) can employ more
sensing resources from the MUs with lower δn. Obviously, this
is also in line with the laws of market economy. In Fig. 6,
the optimal pricing strategy determined by the SP and the
optimal individual resources allocation strategy of each MU
have a slow increase with larger value of λ. It is because the
SP with larger gained utilities will pay higher price to MUs
and get more sensing resources from MUs, aiming to obtain
more payoff.
Fig. 7 illustrates the SE of MUs with the different cn under
dynamic game. In this group of simulations, δn = 1, while
cn is randomly chosen from [0, 1). We can obtain from this
figure that under this setting, there is also a unique SE between
SP and MUs. Fig. 7a shows that under the same λ, p∗n will
increase with cn, this is because the SP needs to pay the
MUs with price higher than the cost cn, or the MUs will not
participate in the MCS. Fig. 7b shows that under the same λ,
the SP will recruit more sensing from the MUs with smaller
cn, this is because the SP recruits more sensing resources form
MU with smaller cn will take a little overhead. Also as has
mentioned above, when the λ is increasing, the MUs with
same cn and δn will allocate more sensing resources to the
SP. Meanwhile, the SP will increase the price p∗n.
Fig. 8 shows the system performance under the impact of
MUs’ upper demand. In this group of simulation, we set δn
and cn randomly select from [0, 1] and δn > cn, λ = 30
and ξn varies from 20 to 30. The simulation results show that
the demand uncertainties have an significant impact on the
system performance. When ξn is higher, its means that the
MUs are more expect to use their smart devices to service
themselves. In this case, if the SP wants to recruit the MUs
to participate in the MCS, it needs to pay more. Fig. 8a
shows that when ξn is increasing, SP needs to increase the
sensing price. Fig. 8b shows that under this condition, MUs
will distribute less resources to participate in the MCS, and left
more resources to serve themselves. Obviously, in this case,
the payoff of the SP will decrease with ξn increasing.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the static MCS game with MUs’ resources
constraints and demand uncertainties is formulated firstly, the
incentive mechanism is then considered based on a Stackelberg
game. The existence of the unique SE is proved and the
expressions for calculating the SE are provided. By analyzing
the SE, it is found that the MUs’ demand uncertainties have
evident impacts on the performance of the MCS system.
Moreover, considering that the SP requires the MUs’ private
information to achieve the SE in the static mobile crowdsens-
ing game, a dynamic DRL-based MCS system is proposed,
where the SP can obtain the optimal pricing strategy without
any prior knowledge of the MUs’ information. Therefore, not
only MUs can be promoted to participate in the dynamic
mobile crowdsensing game, but also the private information
of MUs can be kept. Finally, simulation results illustrate that
the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism and approach. In
future, crowdsensing game with different sensing quality and
faked sensing attacks will be researched and the robustness of
the DRL approach for private information protection will be
enhanced.
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